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This paper analyzes the implications of foreign firm ownership and international profit 
shifting through thin capitalization for corporate tax policy. We consider a model of 
interjurisdictional tax competition where the corporate tax serves as a backstop to the personal 
income tax, interest on debt is deductible from the corporate tax base and multinational firms 
may shift profit across countries through thin capitalization. We show that the problem of thin 
capitalization induces countries to reduce their corporate tax rates below the personal income 
tax rate and to broaden their tax bases. Moreover, foreign firm ownership leads to a reduction 
in corporate tax rates. We also show that there is scope for welfare enhancing tax coordination 
in our model. In the presence of both foreign firm ownership and thin capitalization, countries 
gain from a coordinated increase in corporate tax rates or from a coordinated broadening of 
the tax base. 
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In recent years, corporate tax policy in most industrialized countries has been characterized
by a trend towards lower tax rates and broader tax bases. In the literature, this trend has
been explained as a reaction of national tax policies to border crossing capital mobility and
an increasing importance of multinational …rms. There are several reasons why the existence
of multinational …rms is thought to have an impact on national corporate tax systems.1
Firstly, when making their location decisions for investment projects, these …rms usually
consider locations in di¤erent countries. Tax considerations are of course not the only factor
determining these location decisions, but they are an important one. From the perspective of
national tax policy, this gives rise to competitive pressure as countries try to attract …rms.
Secondly, multinational …rms may shift pro…ts across countries without changing the loca-
tion of their real investment. This may be done either via transfer price manipulation (Hau‡er
and Schjelderup (2000)) or thin capitalization, where …rms increase the amount of debt …n-
ancing in high tax countries in order to bene…t from the deductibility of interest from the
corporate tax base (Mintz and Smart (2001)). It is intuitive that international pro…t shifting
also leads to downward pressures on national corporate tax rates.
A third important characteristic of multinational …rms is that the ownership of these …rms
usually spreads over many countries. This implies that multinational …rms often operate in
countries other than those wheretheir ownersreside. Foreign …rm ownership is usually thought
to act as a break on the downward pressure on corporate tax rates caused by tax competition
(Huizinga and Nielsen (1997)).
This paper reconsiders the implications of foreign …rm ownership and international pro…t
shifting through thin capitalization for corporate tax policy. The analysis leads to three main
results. Firstly, it turns out that foreign …rm ownership leads to a reduction rather than an
increase in corporate tax rates. Secondly, the existence of international pro…t shifting through
thin capitalization induces countries to reduce their tax rates and to broaden their tax bases.
Thirdly, we show that there is scope for welfare enhancing tax coordination in our model. In
the presence of both foreign …rm ownership and income shifting through debt, countries gain
from a coordinated increase in corporate tax rates or from a coordinated broadening of the
tax base.
How are these …ndings related to the existing literature? The papers most closely related
to our analysis are Hau‡er and Schjelderup (2000), Bond (2000) and Huizinga and Nielsen
(1997, 2002). Hau‡er and Schjelderup (2000) consider a model where …rms earn supernormal
pro…ts and may manipulate transfer prices to shift pro…ts across countries. In the absence
of pro…t shifting, countries would levy a cash ‡ow tax which avoids a distortion of marginal
investment but taxes pure pro…ts at a con…scatory rate of 100%. However, if …rms may shift
income across jurisdictions, they can avoid the con…scatory taxation of pure pro…ts, so that
countries are forced to reduce their tax rates. As a result, pure pro…ts are partly untaxed.
Given this, it is optimal to tax these pro…ts indirectly by broadening the tax base, even at the
cost of distorting domestic investment. Bond (2000) argues that multinational …rms often face
a discrete investment choice. For instance, this may be the choice between serving a domestic
market either by producing in the country or by locating in another country and serving the
domestic market via imports. This implies that the average rather than the marginal tax rate
becomes relevant for the location decision. If, in addition, an investment project generates
supernormal pro…ts, high statutory rates may deter investment despite generous depreciation
1For a survey on the taxation of multinational …rms see Gresik (2001).
1allowances. Both papers thus provide an explanation for the observed tax rate cut cum base
broadening policies.2
Our analysis di¤ers from these papers in several respects. Firstly, our model does not rely
on the existence of pure pro…ts so that the corporate income tax does not have the function of
taxing pure pro…ts. Secondly, we consider income shifting through debt, rather than transfer
pricing. Thirdly, the reasons for and the e¤ects of tax rate cut cum base broadening policies
are di¤erent in our model. In particular, the broadening of the tax base in Hau‡er and
Schjelderup (2000) deliberately distorts domestic investment, whereas the broadening of the
tax base in our model aims at restoring production e¢ciency.
Our result that foreign …rm ownership reduces corporate tax rates is diametrically opposed
to the …ndings in Huizinga and Nielsen (1997), who …nd that foreign …rm ownership tends to
increase corporate taxes. The reason for this di¤erence in results is that, in our model, the
corporate tax has the function of serving as a backstop to personal income taxes while the
corporate tax in Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) is e¤ectively a tax on economic rents. In their
model, these rents partly accrue to foreigners. Therefore host countries have an incentive to
raise their corporate tax rates above the level they would choose in the absence of foreign …rm
ownership.3 Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) also …nd that a coordinated reduction of corpor-
ate taxes increases welfare in their model whereas our analysis leads to the opposite result.
Huizinga and Nielsen (2002) extend the model in Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) by considering
the case where residence based taxes on portfolio investment cannot be implemented. In this
framework, it turns out that the welfare e¤ect of a coordinated reduction of tax rates becomes
ambiguous.4
The rest of the paper is set up as follows. In the next section, we present the model. In
section 3, we analyze the optimal tax policy under tax competition, under di¤erent assump-
tions on foreign …rm ownership and the availability of income shifting opportunities. Section
4 considers the potential for welfare enhancing tax coordination. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a union of n small open economies. Capital is internationally mobile both within
the union and between the union and the rest of the world. Each country in the union is
the home country of many internationally immobile households and hosts real investment of
a large number of multinational …rms. For notational convenience, the number of households
per country and the number of multinational …rms are normalized to unity.
2A third, information based explanation for tax rate cut cum base broadening policies is suggested by
Osmundsen, Hagen, and Schjelderup (1998), who consider a world where …rms face di¤erent mobility costs
and the government cannot observe …rm speci…c mobility. In this framework, it turns out that a corporate tax
system with broad bases and low tax rates improves the incentives for …rms to reveal their true type.
3Olsen and Osmundsen (2001) derive a similar result in an imperfect information setting. Kind, Midelfart,
and Schjelderup (2003) …nd the same e¤ect of foreign ownership in a model with trade costs.
4Foreign ownership of domestic factors of production is also analysed by Richter and Wellisch (1996), in
the context of household mobility, and by Wildasin and Wilson (1998), who show that con…scatory taxation
of rents in the presence of foreign …rm ownership may hinder risk diversi…cation.
22.1 Households
Households live for two periods. In the …rst period, they receive an exogenous endowment E
and a dividend D1
5 which may be used for …rst period consumption C1 or savings S.6 The
…rst period budget constraint is
E +D1 = C1 +S: (1)
In the second period, the household supplies L units of labour and receives another dividend
D2. The second period budget constraint is
C2 = (1 +r (1¡ t))S + D2 + w(1¡ T)L (2)
where C2 is second period consumption, r is the interest rate in the international capital mar-
ket, t is the tax rate on savings, w is the wage rate and T is the tax rate on labour income. The
household’s utility function is given by U(C1;C2;L) and has the usual neoclassical properties.
Denote the present value of the dividends accruing to the domestic household by P. Using
P = D1 +
D2
(1+ r(1¡ t))
and de…ning savings net of dividends received in period 1 as S¤ = S ¡ D1, we can write the
budget constraints in (1) and (2) as
E = C1 + S
¤ (3)
and
C2 = (1+ r(1¡ t))(S
¤ + P) +w (1¡ T)L (4)
















where wn = w (1¡ T) and rn = r(1 ¡ t): (5) and (6) de…ne the (modi…ed) savings function
S¤ = S¤(rn;wn;P) and the labour supply function Ls = Ls(rn;wn;P): The household’s
indirect utility function is denoted by V (rn;wn;P) and has the properties V1(rn;wn;P) =
‚(S¤ +P), V2(rn;wn;P) = ‚L, V3(rn;wn;P) = ‚(1 +r(1 ¡ t)), where ‚ is the marginal
utility of second period income.
2.2 Firms
We assume that the representative multinational …rm is endowed with retained earnings R
and that it operates in each of the n countries in the union. In each country j;j = 1::n, the
…rm invests Kj in period 1. In period 2, the …rm employs Lj units of labour in each country
and produces an output F(Kj;Lj)+Kj. We assume that F(Kj;Lj)+Kj is linear-homogenous
in Kj and Lj.
5We abstract from dividend taxes, for reasons which will be discussed further below.
6In order to reduce notation, we drop country indices if possible.
3The …rm’s investment may be …nanced by retained earnings or debt. New equity as a
source of …nance is ruled out.7 Retained earnings which are not used to …nance investment
are distributed to the owners. The …rm’s pro…t distribution in period 1 is given by …1 = R¡ Pn
i=1(1¡ ﬁi)Ki, where ﬁj is the share of investment in country j …nanced by external debt.8
Next to external debt, the …rm may also use internal debt. The main di¤erence to external
debt is that internal debt does not increase dividend distributions. Internal debt is used to
avoid corporate taxes. Rather than using equity to …nance investment directly, the …rm may
endow a subsidiary in a tax haven country which we assume to be a country outside the
union with equity. The subsidiary then borrows its funds back to the parent company.9 This
implies that corporate income takes the form of interest payments, which are deductible from
the corporate tax base. To make things simple, we assume that the corporate tax rate in
the tax haven country is zero. Moreover, in all countries, foreign pro…ts are assumed to be
exempt from domestic corporate tax, so that pro…ts of the subsidiary in the tax haven can
be repatriated tax free.10 Under these assumptions, the …rm’s reduction in tax costs from
replacing one Euro of equity in country j by internal debt is simply equal to the country’s
corporate tax rate ¿j. In the following, we denote the share of internal debt in the …rm’s
investment in country j by ￿j:
Apart from tax considerations, there are nontax costs and bene…ts associated with the
…nancial structure of …rms. We assume that the nontax costs and bene…ts of …nancing in
our model can be summarized in a cost function which is given by r
Pn
i=1ª(ﬁi;￿i)Ki ,
where ª(ﬁ;￿) is a function with the following properties: ªﬁ(ﬁ¤;￿) = 0, ªﬁ(ﬁ;￿) > 0 if
ﬁ > ﬁ¤;ªﬁ(ﬁ;￿) < 0 if ﬁ < ﬁ¤ and ªﬁﬁ(ﬁ;￿) > 0, where 0 < ﬁ¤ < 1 . Moreover, we
assume that ªﬁ￿(ﬁ;￿) = 0;ª￿(ﬁ;0) = 0;ª￿ (ﬁ;￿) > 0 if ￿ > 0;ª￿(ﬁ;￿) < 0 and if ￿ < 0
ª￿￿(ﬁ;￿) > 0. These assumptions essentially imply that there is a share of external debt
ﬁ¤ which is optimal in the absence of taxes, given ￿: Of course, without taxes, we also have
￿ = 0. If …rms deviate from ﬁ = ﬁ¤ and ￿ = 0, they face increasing marginal nontax costs of
distorting their …nancial structure.
Given that the function ª(ﬁ;￿) is important for the following analysis, it is necessary
to justify the assumptions made on ª(ﬁ;￿) , in particular the convexity in ﬁ and ￿. The
assumptionthat ª(ﬁ;￿) is convex inﬁ follows MintzandSmart(2002)andmay beinterpreted
as a result of informational asymmetries between outside investors and managers of the …rm.
For instance, of there is too little external debt, managers may use the …rm’s cash ‡ow to
pursue empire building strategies (Hart (1993)). An increase in external debt reduces the
cash ‡ow controlled by managers. But if there is too much debt, the …rm may go bankrupt,
7This is in line with the empirical fact that the role of new equity for the …nancing of investment is small,
see e.g. Bond (2000).
8Note that the dividend which accrues to the representative household in country j in period 1 is given by
D1j = ﬂj…1, where ﬂ j is the share in the multinational …rm’s equity owned by the household in country j.
9Real world tax avoidance through internal debt will of course be more subtle but the model captures
the essentials of the process. Often, tax avoidance through thin capitalization involves so-called “double dip”
transactions, where the funds used to endow foreign subsidiaries are borrowed in high tax countries to generate
additional interest deductions, see Fuest, Huber, and Mintz (2003).
10One might object here that exemption may be denied for pro…ts repatriated from tax haven countries which
have no double taxation agreements with the country where the parent company resides. But tax avoidance
through internal debt is also possible by using special tax arrangements o¤ered by countries covered by double
taxation agreements. One example is the Belgian Financial Coordination Center (Malherbe (2002)). Even if
exemption is denied, the deferral of tax obligations may be su¢cient as an incentive to use internal debt as
an income shifting device. For an analysis of tax competition where foreign pro…ts are taxed according to the
credit system or the deduction system see Fuest and Huber (2002).
4which gives rise to bankruptcy costs. Consider next the cost associated with internal debt.
In the theoretical literature on the economic role of internal debt, the view is widespread
that internal debt is primarily a tax saving instrument (see e.g. Chowdhry and Nanda (1994)
and Chowdhry and Coval (1998)). Recent empirical work by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003)
con…rms this view but also shows that, despite the tax advantage, the use of internal debt
has its limits, i.e. internal debt is usually combined with external debt and equity. One
explanation for the fact that multinational …rms cannot use internal debt without limits is
that tax authorities are aware of the pro…t shifting opportunities o¤ered by internal debt.
Therefore, many governments have introduced anti tax avoidance laws in order to limit pro…t
shifting.11 For instance, German corporate tax law includes a rule (§8a, KStG) whereby
interest deductions for internal debt will only be granted if the credit would also have been
granted by thirdparties. Similar rules exist in the UK (see Rowland (1995)) andinthe US(see
Levin (1994)). These rules leave some discretion to tax authorities and courts in dealing with
internal debt. Itis plausible toassume that the chances of …rms to avoid the applicationof anti
tax avoidance legislation will be better, the smaller the share of internal debt in overall assets.
Also, the amount of advice by tax consultants required to achieve a deduction for interest on
internal debt is likely to be convex in the level of internal debt. Our model captures this by
assuming that ª(ﬁ;￿) is convex in ￿.















where "i is a parameter describing the depreciation allowances of the tax system in country j.
True economic depreciation implies "i = 0: Accordingly, "i < 0 implies less than economic de-
preciation whereas "i > 0 would characterize a tax system with accelerated depreciation. The
lowest possible value for "i is "i = ¡1, whichwould describe the extreme case where investment
goods cannot be depreciated for tax purposes at all. The …rst term on the right hand side
of (7) represents output minus wage payments minus …nancing costs and the tax free capital
repayment Ki. The second term is the payment of credit plus interest on external debt. The
third term represents the interest deductions on overall debt and the fourth term represents
the value of depreciation allowances as far as they deviate from economic depreciation.
The …rm maximizes the present value of the dividends paid to the owners. Since there may
be owners in di¤erent countries who may face di¤erent capital income tax rates, the question
arises how the …rm determines the opportunity cost of investment and, hence, the relevant
discount rates. We simply assume that the …rm uses a weighted average of the di¤erent
discount rates12, so that the objective function of the …rm is




where ﬂj, j = 1:::n, is the ownership share of the representative household residing in country
j. Using …1 = R¡
Pn
i=1(1¡ ﬁi)Ki, substituting (7) into (8) and maximizing (8) over Lj and
11For an analysis of the impact of anti tax avoidance measures on the cost of capital of foreign subsidiaries
see Weichenrieder (1996).
12To the extent that the following analysis applies to the case with owners residing in di¤erent countries,





























While (9) and (10) are standard marginal productivity conditions, (11) and (12) describe the
optimal …nancial structure of the …rm. In the absence of taxes, the …rm minimizes the nontax
cost of …nancing by setting ﬁ = ﬁ¤and ￿ = 0. If taxes exist but ¿j =
Pn
i=1ﬂiti, the tax system
is neutral with respect to the …rm’s choice of external debt because the tax advantage of debt
caused by the deductibility of interest at the corporate level is neutralized by the taxation of
interest income at the personal level. In contrast, if ¿j <
Pn
i=1ﬂiti, the tax system distorts the
…nancial structure in favour of equity and vice versa. Of course, as (12) shows, any positive
corporate income tax will give rise to income shifting via internal debt (￿ > 0).
Given the assumption that the production function is linear-homogenous in K and L,
which implies F (Ki;Li) ¡ wiLi =
@F(Kj;Lj)
@Kj Kj = `jKj, equations (9) to (12) determine the
functions ﬁj = ﬁj(¿j;t);wj = wj(`j) and Kj = Kj(`j;L) . In equilibrium, employment is
e¤ectively determined by the labour supply function, i.e. Lj = Ls
j(rn;wn;P): The constant
returns to scale assumption implies that there are no (supernormal) pro…ts. Using (9) to (12),
it is straightforward to show that, in equilibrium, ¦ = …1 + …2 Pn
i=1 ﬂi(1+r(1¡ti)) = R, i.e. the
present value of the …rm’s stream of dividends is equal to the …rm’s endowment with retained
earnings.
2.3 The government
The government has to …nance a given level of public expenditures (G) using the wage tax,
the tax on personal savings and the corporate income tax.13
The government budget constraint is
Gj = (wj ¡ w
n
j)Lj + rtjSj +¿j[F (Kj;Lj)¡ wjLj ¡ ª(ﬁj;￿j)rKj
¡r(ﬁj +￿j)Kj ¡ "jKj] (13)
The …rst and second terms on the right hand side of (13) represent the revenue from the labour
and savings income tax. The third term represents revenue from corporate income taxation.
13We abstract from dividend taxes because, in line with the “new view” of dividend taxation, dividend taxes
would be neutral in our model. Adding dividend taxes would imply that the government will receive some
revenue from a non-distortionary tax. But the main results of our analysis would not change.
6Using Sj = S¤
j +Dj1 = S¤
j +ﬂj(R¡
Pn
i=1(1¡ﬁi)Ki) and F (Ki;Li)¡wiLi = `jKj, the budget




















(1 ¡ ﬁi)Ki: (14)
3 The optimal tax policy under tax competition
In this section, we derive the optimal tax policy in our model. The government ofeachcountry
maximizes theutility ofthe representative citizen and takes the tax policy ofall other countries

























The formal derivation of the optimal tax policy is given in the appendix. In the text, we only
present the results and discuss their economic implications. Our main interest is to analyze
the consequences of foreign …rm ownership and income shifting through internal debt for the
optimal tax policy of the individual countries. Moreover, we ask whether there is scope for
policy coordination among the member states of the union. We therefore proceed in four steps.
We start by considering the optimal tax policy of an individual country where the domestic
household fully owns the multinational …rm and no internal debt exists. We then consider
the case where …rm ownership is symmetric, i.e. the representative household in each country
owns a share 1=n in the …rm’s equity. The third step is to allow for income shifting. Finally,
we will analyze the potential for welfare enhancing policy coordination.
3.1 No internal debt, no foreign …rm ownership
This case refers to a situation where the ownershipof the multinational …rm is concentrated in
one country. We refer to this country as country 1. The possibility of income shifting through
debt is ruled out. The optimal tax policy of country 1 may be characterized by the following
Proposition 1 If income shifting through internal debt is ruled out (￿ = 0) and if the mul-
tinational …rm is fully owned by the domestic household (ﬂ1 = 1), the optimal tax policy in







































Ki = 0 (16)
Proof: See the appendix.
The interpretation of the results in proposition 1 is as follows. Firstly, the corporate
income tax rate is equal to the tax rate on income from personal savings. This re‡ects that
the corporate income tax in our model has the function to prevent that taxpayers avoid the
savings tax by deferring thedistribution ofpro…ts. They candeferpro…tdistributions either by
increasing the share of equity …nancing or by increasing the level of the …rm’s real investment.
The optimal tax policy sets ¿1 = t1 in order to avoid distortions of …nancial structure or real
investment.
The level of the savings tax and the labour income tax are determined by the usual trade-
o¤ between the necessity to raise tax revenue and the distortions of savings and labour supply
decisions which characterizes a second best optimal tax system. These considerations are
re‡ected by the …rst two terms on the left hand side of equations (15) and (16). The third
term on the left hand side of (16) re‡ects that part ofthe household’s savings e¤ectively consist
of retained earnings which the …rm uses to …nance real investment in other countries. While
savings in the form of domestic, equity …nanced real investment are taxed via the corporate
income tax, savings in the form of equity …nanced real investment abroad escape domestic
taxation. There is nothing the government can do about this in our model. The fourth term
on the left hand side of (16) re‡ects that an increase in the domestic savings tax will induce
the multinational …rm to increase the amount of equity …nanced investment abroad, so that
the domestic tax base is reduced further. The result that the government sets " = 0, together
with ¿ = t, implies that production e¢ciency is preserved, i.e. the cost of capital is the same
as in the absence of taxes: `1 = r(1+ ª)
3.2 The impact of foreign …rm ownership
Assume now that the ownership of the …rm is symmetrically distributed among all countries,
so that the representative household in country j only owns a share ﬂj = 1=n of the …rm’s
equity. As in the preceding section, we assume that income shifting through internal debt is
ruled out. The optimal levels of the tax on labour income and the personal tax on savings are
again determined by standard optimal tax considerations as described above. We therefore
concentrate on the corporate tax system. Here we may state
Proposition 2 If …rm ownership is distributed symmetrically among all countries ¡
ﬂj = 1=n;j = 1::n
¢
and income shifting is ruled out, the optimal tax policy of country j
implies ¿j < tj and "j = 0. Real investment is subsidized: `j < r(1+ ª).
Proof: See the appendix.
Interestingly, while the government sets ¿j = tj if the household entirely owns the …rms
operating within the country, we now have ¿j < tj, which implies that foreign …rm ownership
8reduces the corporate tax rate and leads to a situation where investment is e¤ectively subsid-
ized. This happens for the following reason. The corporate income tax has the function to
prevent that households avoid personal income taxes by increasing equity …nancing and over-
investing in the domestic corporate sector. The government designs the corporate income tax
system so that the e¤ect of a marginal change in domestic investment Kj on the government
budget constraint is zero. Given the …nancial structure ﬁj, an increase in domestic investment
by one Euro reduces dividend distributions to and, hence, private savings of domestic house-
holds in period 1 by ﬂj(1 ¡ ﬁj) Euros. As a result, the revenue from the savings tax declines
by rtﬂj (1¡ ﬁj). The optimal corporate tax neutralizes this revenue loss. But if the domestic
ownership share ﬂj is small, the optimal corporate income tax declines. In our model, if n
approaches in…nity, i.e. the ownership share of the domestic household in the …rms operating
domestically becomes negligible, the optimal corporate tax rate approaches zero.
The result that the corporate tax rate declines as foreign ownership of domestic …rms
increases is diametrically opposedto the …ndings inHuizingaandNielsen(1997), where foreign
…rm ownership leads to higher corporate tax rates. The reason for this di¤erence is that the
corporate tax in Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) has a di¤erent economic function. In their
model, …rms earn supernormal pro…ts which cannot be taxed directly. Therefore, a corporate
tax which distorts investment is used as an indirect way of taxing these pro…ts. If foreign …rm
ownershipincreases, anincreasing share of pro…ts generated domestically accrues toforeigners,
so that the burden of domestic corporate taxes also partly falls on foreigners. Consequently,
more foreign …rm ownership increases the optimal corporate tax rate. In our model, this type
of tax exporting motive does not exist.
3.3 Income Shifting without foreign …rm ownership
We now consider the case where …rms may use internal debt to avoid domestic corporate
income taxes. In order to be able to focus on the role of income shifting, we abstract from
foreign …rm ownership by considering the case where the household of country 1 owns 100% of
the multinational …rm’s equity. As in the preceding section, we focus onthe optimal corporate
tax policy which is summarized by
Proposition 3 If …rms may use internal debt for income shifting and if …rm ownership is
concentrated in country 1 (ﬂ1 = 1), the optimal tax system implies ¿1 < t1 and "1 < 0.
Production e¢ciency is preserved: `1 = r(1+ ª1).
Proof: See the appendix.
It turns out that the existence of income shifting induces governments to reduce the cor-
porate tax rate and at the same time to broaden the tax base by curtailing depreciation
allowances. This may be explained as follows. The government wants to reduce the corporate
tax rate in order to limit the incentives to shift income to tax havens via internal debt. But
reducing the corporate tax rate below the income tax rate distorts the choice between equity
and external debt in favour of equity. The optimal corporate tax rate re‡ects the trade-o¤
between the aims of reducing income shifting and the desire to limit the distortion of the
…nancial structure of …rms in favour of equity.14 Next to the e¤ect on the …nancial structure
14The existence of external debt thus acts as a break on corporate tax rate reductions. A referee raised the
question of how the results would change if we assumed that …rms did not use external debt at all. In this
case, it can be shown that the government would set ¿ < t and " = ¡1, i.e. the pressure to broaden corporate
tax bases and to reduce tax rates would increase. The proof for this result is available from the authors on
request.
9of the …rm, the reduction of the corporate tax rate below the income tax rate t also implies
that the domestic tax system subsidizes domestic real investment. Since such a subsidy is
not desirable, the government reduces depreciation allowances ("j < 0) in order to restore
production e¢ciency.
How is the result in proposition 3 related to explanations for tax rate cut cum base broad-
ening policies existing in the literature? Hau‡er and Schjelderup (2000) consider a model
where …rms make pure pro…ts and may use transfer pricing to shift these pro…ts to tax haven
countries. Without pro…t shifting via transfer prices, national governments would levy cash
‡ow taxes which allow to tax pure pro…ts at 100% without distorting the marginal invest-
ment decision. If however …rms can avoid a con…scatory taxation of their pro…ts by shifting
pro…ts to other countries, countries will reduce their tax rates below 100% in order to limit
the incentives for income shifting. But given that pure pro…ts are now partly untaxed, it is
no longer optimal to preserve production e¢ciency. Instead, countries broaden their tax bases
and deviate from production e¢ciency. The di¤erence to our results is that, in our model,
there are no supernormal pro…ts and, more importantly, the broadening of the tax base aims
at restoring production e¢ciency rather than deviating from it.
Bond (2000) explains the tax rate cut cum base broadening policy as re‡ecting the view
that multinational …rms make discrete investmentdecisions whichare guided by average rather
than marginal tax rates. Osmundsen, Hagen, and Schjelderup (1998) consider a world where
…rms di¤er with respect to their mobility and corporate tax policy is plagued by problems
of asymmetric information. In this framework, a tax rate cut cum base broadening policy is
optimal because it improves incentives for relatively immobile …rms to reveal their true type
instead of mimicking mobile …rms.
3.4 Income shifting and foreign …rm ownership
The case analyzedin the preceding sectionrefers to a worldwhere …rm ownership is completely
concentrated in one country. Given the setup of our model, this would imply that there are
n ¡ 1 countries where the domestic household owns no equity of the multinational …rm, so
that these countries do not levy corporate income taxes. Such an equilibrium is not realistic.
In this section, we therefore consider the case where income shifting exists but countries are
symmetric, i.e. the representative household in each country owns a share ﬂj = 1=n of the
…rm’s equity. The optimal tax policy is now as follows:
Proposition 4 If …rms may use internal debt for income shifting and if …rm ownership is
distributed symmetrically among all countries (ﬂj = 1=n;j = 1::n), the optimal tax policy of
country j implies ¿j < tj and "j < 0. Real investment is subsidized: `j < r(1+ ª).
Proof: See the appendix.
Proposition 4 shows that, in the presence of both income shifting and foreign …rm own-
ership, the e¤ects discussed in the preceding sections are combined. Propositions 3 and 4
have in common that the optimal tax policy implies ¿j < tj and "j < 0. This means that a
tax rate cut cum base broadening policy is optimal for any ownership structure (apart from
the extreme case of ﬂj = 0, where country j does not levy corporate taxes). It is su¢cient
that income shifting through internal debt occurs. The explanation for this result is that
governments reduce their corporate tax rates in order to limit the use of internal debt. But
this has the undesirable consequence that domestic investment is subsidized, at the margin.
The broadening of the tax base corrects this distortion. The result in proposition 4 that real
10investment is subsidized (whereas this is not the case in proposition 3) is a consequence of
foreign …rm ownership.
4 Policy coordination
It is natural to ask whether there is room for welfare enhancing policy coordination among
the n countries of the union. It is well known from the literature on tax coordination that a
case for tax coordination can be made on the basis that the elasticity of capital supply for the
union as a whole may di¤er from the elasticity of capital supply faced by individual countries.
By assuming that the e¤ect of the union on the world interest rate is negligible, this class of
arguments in favour of tax coordination is ruled out in our model. Moreover, it is well known
that asymmetries between countries considerably complicates the analysis of tax coordination
because some countries may gain at the expense of other countries. We therefore focus on the
question of tax coordination among symmetric countries. Here, we may state:
Proposition 5 If …rms may use internal debt for income shifting and if …rm ownership is
distributed symmetrically among all countries
¡
ﬂj = 1=n;j = 1::n
¢
, a coordinated increase
of the corporate tax rate, departing from the equilibrium without coordination and holding
constant the depreciation parameter ", increases welfare.
Proof: See the appendix.
The reason for the positive welfare e¤ect of an increase in the corporate tax rate is best
understood by considering the …scal externalities associated with a change in the tax rate.
A higher corporate tax rate in country j reduces the share of equity in the …nancing of real
investment in this country, i.e. ﬁj increases. Moreover, an increase in ¿j raises the cost of
capital incountry j and reduces the level of real investment Kj. Both e¤ects raise the dividend
distributed in period 1. Since …rm ownership is symmetrically distributed over all countries
of the union, the higher dividend in period 1 increases private savings and, hence, revenue
from the savings tax in all countries. This e¤ect on savings tax revenue in other countries
constitutes a positive …scal externality.
Onemay notethat this reasonfor the positive welfare e¤ect of a coordinated increase in the
corporate tax rate di¤ers from the standard argument in favour of corporate tax coordination,
which is based on the idea that higher taxes in one country increase real investment in other
countries. This typeof …scal externality is absent from our model becausethe union is assumed
to have no impact on the interest rate in the world capital market.15
For similar reasons, our model allows to make a case for tax base coordination:
Proposition 6 If …rms may use internal debt for income shifting and if …rm ownership is
distributed symmetrically among all countries
¡
ﬂj = 1=n;j = 1::n
¢
, a coordinated reduction of
the depreciation parameter "j, departing from the equilibrium without coordination and holding
constant the corporate tax rate, increases welfare.
Proof: See the appendix.
The reduction in the depreciation parameter implies a further broadening of the tax base
(note that the reform already departs from an equilibrium with "j < 0). The reason for the
15Tax coordination among countries of a union which has some market power in the international capital
market is studied e.g. by Konrad and Schjelderup (1999).
11positive welfare e¤ect of a coordinated broadening of the tax base is again that changes in the
depreciation parameter in one country give rise to a …scal externality: under tax competition,
the individual countries do not take into account that, by broadening the tax base, real
investment of the multinational …rm declines and more funds are distributed in period 1, so
that savings tax revenue in all countries increases.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the implications of international income shifting and foreign
…rm ownership for corporate tax policy. Our analysis has shown that foreign …rm ownership
does not necessarily act as a break on tax rate reductions. Moreover, tax rate cut cum base
broadeningpolicies may be seenas areactionofnational tax policiestoincomeshifting through
internal debt. This result is similar to the …ndings in Hau‡er and Schjelderup (2000), but the
reason for the broadening of the tax base and the implications for production e¢ciency are
di¤erent. Finally, we have shown that there is a potential for welfare enhancing coordination
of tax rates and tax bases in our model.
There are several limitations of our analysis which should be taken into account. Firstly,
our analysis is based on the assumption that residence based taxation of personal savings is
possible. It is well known that taxpayers may evade these taxes relatively easily by holding
bank accounts in other countries. But as long as interest income can at least partly be taxed
on a residence basis, our …ndings should continue to hold. Secondly, we assume that foreign
…rm ownership is given and ask how the optimal tax policy reacts to this. This neglects that
the structure of …rm ownership itself will be in‡uenced by taxes. Clearly, investigating this is
beyond the scope of this paper.16 Another, more fundamental issue raised by our analysis is
whether countries should simply abolish interest deductions in order to avoid income shifting
through debt. In our model, this wouldgive rise to asevere distortionof the…nancial structure
of …rms in favour ofequity …nancing, sothatzero interest deductions are unlikely tobe optimal.
But it is not clear that this is a su¢cient reason to maintain the full deductibility of interest.
We intend to investigate this issue in future research.
A Appendix
In this appendix, we give the proofs of propositions 1-6. We start by deriving the …rst-
order conditions (f.o.c.) for the optimal tax policy. These will be used in the proofs of all
propositions. The Lagrangean for the government’s problem is
¡(w
n
j;tj;`j;¿j;"j) = V (r
n;w




















16For an analysis of the impact of economic integration on tax policy in a model with endogenous foreign
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We focus on the case where the constraint " ¸ ¡1 is not binding, so that # = 0. Given this,





























¿j = 0 (A.7)
Proof of proposition 1. If ￿j = 0;
@￿j
@¿j = 0, ﬂj = 1;j = 1, and using (A.4) in (A.2), (A.1)
and (A.2) yield (15) and (16) in proposition 1. (A.7) and (A.6) collapse to ¿j = tj and "j = 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2. If ￿j = 0;
@￿j












13which can be rearranged to
¿j =
tj
1+ (n ¡ 1)(1¡ tj)
< tj
Using ￿j = 0;
@￿j
@¿j = 0;ﬂj = 1=n;j = 1:::n in (A.6) yields "j = 0. Using "j = 0 and
¿j =
tj
1+(n¡1)(1¡tj) in (9) shows that
`j = r
µ




< r(ªj + 1)
Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 3 . If ﬂj = 1;j = 1, it follows from (A.7) that






>From (A.6), we get






Since ￿j > 0 it follows that "j < 0: Substituting (A.8) into (9) yields
`j = r(ªj + 1)
Q.E.D.
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¿j(1 ¡ tj) ¡
tj
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Since ￿j > 0 and given that the left hand side of (A.9) is negative, it follows that "j < 0.
Using these results in (9) yields
`j = r
µ




< r(ªj + 1)
Q.E.D.
14Proof of proposition 5. A coordinated change in ¿j;j = 1::::n a¤ects welfare directly and
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Given that the f.o.c. for the optimal policy under tax competition imply
@¡j
@¿ j = 0 and
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@`j = 0,


























Proof of proposition 6. A coordinated change in "j;j = 1::::n a¤ects welfare directly and


















Given that the f.o.c. for the optimal policy under tax competition imply
@¡j
@"j = 0 and
@¡j
@`j = 0,





















which implies that a coordinated reduction in " increases welfare. Q.E.D.
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